DROPPING THE HOT POTATO: RESUSCITATING THE PERMISSIVE WITHDRAWAL RULES IN
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

H. Max Kelln+

INTRODUCTION
Loyalty is a central tenet to a lawyer’s relationship with a client.1 Yet, the phrase “duty
of loyalty” is so ubiquitous in the conflict of interest rules that the phrase has become
axiomatic.2 On the contrary, loyalty rightly has been described by some as a “fulcrum in the
persistent struggle to define the nature of lawyering.”3 Inherent in the duty of loyalty are the
duties to avoid conflict of interests, preserve client property, and preserve client
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confidentiality.4 Of the three duties, perhaps no duty provides as many ethical pitfalls as the
duty to avoid conflicts of interests.5
In their article titled The Practice of Law and Conflicts of Interest: Living Close to the
Line, Spellmire and Tweet succinctly outline the three basic situations where conflicts arise.6
The three situations are described as follows:
First, conflicts can exist between the clients' expressed interests and society's
interest in the administration of justice. Second, a conflict can exist when the
interests of one client may impair the independent professional judgment of
the lawyer with regard to another client. Third, a conflict can exist when
lawyers' own interests may impair their exercise of independent professional
judgment on behalf of a client. This third situation is more accurately
described as the representation of "adverse interests."7
As will be discussed later, circumstances giving rise to a conflict of interest necessarily
involve a diminution in the ability to carry out the duties of maintaining client
confidentiality and preservation of client property, even though each are considered part of
the tripartite of loyalty.8 Yet, an attorney acting under a conflict of interest also implicates
the inability of the attorney to fulfill other core duties such as competence and
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communication to the client.9 That is why many attorneys today “tend[] to equate all of
ethics with conflicts of interests.”10
The risks associated with practicing law are increasing.11 Today, allegations that a
lawyer has failed to exercise independent judgment on behalf of a client due to a conflict of
interest are a common basis for malpractice suits;12 in extreme cases, an attorney’s statements
regarding his conflicts of interest may result in jail time.13 The increasing rate of law firm
mergers14 and attorney lateral movement between law firms,15 coupled with the corresponding
exponentional growth and expansion of law firms’ corporate clients16 creates an ethical
environment nearly impossible to navigate in today’s complicated legal landscape. As a
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result, law firms have expended significant resources implementing conflict-checking systems
to avoid these conflicts.17
Given the many competing, yet coexisting ethical duties of an attorney, aggravated by
the complicated network due to the shifting and ambiguous status of clients, it is a misnomer
that an attorney can avoid conflicts altogether. Some conflicts are inevitable.18 For example,
Prof. Dennis Tuchler, a law professor at St. Louis University School of Law, points out in his
article Unavoidable Conflicts of Interests and the Duty of Loyalty, that “conflicts between a
client’s interest arise naturally from the business relationship between them.”19 Thus, it is
more accurate to say that an attorney must actually juggle competing loyalties and avoid
totally only certain types of enumerated conflicts of interests.20
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exemplifies the hollowness of some of these conventions: by definition an attorney cannot
have “undivided loyalty” to more than one object at a time.
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As difficult as it is to traverse the minefields of today’s ethical landscape,21 often
equally difficult is deciding the prudent course of action after one becomes enmeshed in an
ethical quagmire. Although the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the respective rules
adopted by the states “admonish attorneys to avoid conflicts of interests, they provide little
guidance in advising attorney how to disentangle themselves once a conflict has arisen.”22 In
response to these difficulties, the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the ABA and
adopted by the states espouse a fairly “generous attitude towards lawyer withdrawal.”23
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct proscribe the general rule that an attorney is
free to withdraw from representation “if it can be accomplished without material adverse
effect on the client’s interest.”24 In other words, an attorney could terminate a client without
cause as long as the client was not actually harmed.25 Nonetheless, the rules of permissive
withdrawal have been tightened where an attorney terminates the representation of a client
due to the attorney’s own economic interest.26 One recently adopted limit on attorney
withdrawal is described in the “hot potato rule.” The so-called “hot potato rule,” coined in the
frequently quoted Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Ass., Inc., states that “a firm may not drop a
21
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client like a hot potato, especially if it is to keep happy a far more lucrative client.”27 This
restriction on the permissive withdrawal rules has been adopted by nearly every state.28 At the
same time, many courts have revisited the “hot potato” rule since its adoption and have begun
carving out exceptions to the rule, especially when the conflict arises through no fault of the
lawyer.29
The rule has two applications: 1) in disciplinary proceedings, and 2) in situations
where one party seeks to disqualify opposing counsel due to a conflict of interest. The hot
potato rule is most often applied when an attorney enters inadvertently into a concurrent
conflict of interest and seeks to avoid disqualification by converting a less favored client into
a former client.30 A common example is where firm A represents a client, but the firm then
merges with firm B, who has a more desirable client engaged in litigation with the other client
in a separate, but unrelated, case.31 Under the hot potato rule, the firm must withdraw from
representing both parties in the two cases, absent special circumstances, and cannot choose
one client over the other.32
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Alternatively, and more controversially, the “hot potato rule” has been applied in
limited cases where an attorney pre-emptively discharges a current client, thus attempting to
transform him into a former client, and then accepts representation from a new, more lucrative
client.33 In this scenario, a “preexisting client is treated as a former client if the withdrawal
occurs at the time that the client and the lawyer contemplated the end of the representation:
the client is former because the lawyer has completed the discrete assignment. Or, the client
is former because the client has discharged the lawyer.”34
Though utilized far more in disqualification proceedings,35 both modes of enforcement
rely purely on the fear of circumvention of the conflict of interests rules and the implications
of loyalty in “switching sides”36 of a conflict in order to secure a more lucrative client. Yet,
courts find it difficult to draw such an interpretation directly from the Model Code and its
progeny.37 This Note will examine in Part I the history of the relevant Professional Cannons,
Professional Codes of Professional Responsibility, and Model Rules of Professional Conduct
dealing with conflicts of interests and termination of client representation. Part II summarizes
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the various cases where courts have adopted the hot potato rule to either disqualification or
disciplinary proceedings and describe the various exceptions to the Hot Potato rule adopted by
the courts.

Part III will analyze the relationship, or lack thereof, between the evolution of the

model rules, the relevant case law in their adoption of the hot potato rule, and the ultimate
goals of the legal self-governing system. Part IV will then describe the various ways that law
firms circumvent the hot potato rule and the practical effects that the hot potato rule has on
today’s legal environment. Finally, Part V will advocate for the abolition of the hot-potato
rule as currently applied by the courts.

I. HISTORY OF THE PROFESSIONAL RULES
A. Conflicts of Interest Rules
The ethical rules promulgated by the ABA have gone through four major incarnations:
the 1908 Cannons of Ethics, ABA Model Codes Of Responsibility of 1969, and the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct of 1983 & 2002.38 In addition, the ALI‘s Restatement
(Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers builds on many of the ABA’s rules and draws on
prevailing trends in case law from various jurisdictions.39 Though the rules regarding
conflicts of interest have largely remained the same, the requirements regarding permissive
withdrawal have been marked by a trend towards giving an attorney greater discretion and
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mobility.40 On the other hand, both the ABA and the respective state courts continue to have
difficulty concisely and simply articulating the rules regarding conflicts of interests: the topic
of conflict of interests spans 181 pages in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers and over eighty-five comments in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.41
Interestingly, the original Cannons of Ethics, adopted by the ABA in 1908, did not use
“loyalty” as a basis for the conflict of interest rules.42 In terms of concurrent conflicts, Canon
6 merely stated that it was “unprofessional to represent differing interests.”43 The same canon
also governed former-client conflicts, it reads:
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to
divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of
retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest
of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.44
Note, however, the original Canons did not reach the question of permissive withdrawal; the
rules governing permissive withdrawal were not adopted until the promulgation of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969.45 The 1969 Model Code attempted to prescribe
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the conflict of interest rules more thoroughly, but in a “confused and confusing way.”46
Canon 5 governed concurrent representation and sought to ensure that an attorney
“exercise[d] independent professional judgment on behalf of a client” by prohibiting the
acceptance or continuance of concurrent representation of multiple clients when the attorney
would be involved in representing “differing interests” or the attorney’s professional
judgment would be adversely affected by the division of loyalty.47
The rule also recognized that an attorney’s own “financial, business, property, or
personal interests” might affect an attorney’s professional judgment on behalf of a client.48
Oddly, former-client conflicts were not included in Canon 5 and where mentioned nowhere
else in the code.49 Instead, the rules governing confidentiality, EC 4-5, and the creation of
Canon 9, which states, “a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety” were
generally thought to govern, among other broad principles, former client conflicts.50
Furthermore, neither EC 4-5, nor Canon 9 mentioned the importance of loyalty in avoiding
conflict of interests.51 Thus reading EC-4-5 and Cannon 9 together creates the inference that
the sole purpose of the rules was to maintain the integrity of the client-lawyer relationship by
preserving client confidences.
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The framers of the 1983 Model Rules expanded the conflict of interests rules from one
canon to six separate sections in an effort to cure many of the prior deficiencies.52 The new
locus of the modern approach to the conflict of interest rules became regulating the degree of
risk that a lawyer will be unable to adequately fulfill all of the competing interests in a given
matter.53 In other words, the rules attempted to manage the degree of likelihood that a
conflict of interest will actually have an adverse effect -- even if the harm never occurs –
whereas the Canons were preoccupied with whether the attorney “appeared” to be acting
ethically from the point of view of the client and the public.54 The California Supreme Court
in Flatt v. Superior Court55 highlighted this concern in the Rules as follows:
The rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well to preclude the honest practitioner from putting
himself in a position where he may be required to choose between conflicting
duties, or be led to attempt to reconcile conflicting interests, rather than to
enforce to their full extent the rights of the interests which he should alone
represent.56
The Model rules abandoned the vague “appearance of impropriety”57 standard in favor
of language defining a conflict of interest in terms of its probable outcome.58 Thus the new
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rule stated that a conflict of interest exists where “there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited” or, in the case of formerclient conflicts, case law evolved prohibiting an attorney representing a new client when the
matter was “substantially related.”59 Thus, the objective method of judging conflict of
interests and the concern for the public’s confidence in the profession remained.60 Also of
relevance was the addition of ethical consideration 5-2 to the Model Code, which states,
“[T]he lawyer’s own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on
representations of a client.”61
The rules governing former-client conflicts drafted in the 1983 Model Rules are
substantially the same as they are today. The Model Rules still reflects that the foremost duty
a lawyer owes to a former client is the avoidance of adverse use of confidential information
learned during the representation.62 The Rules officially adopted the “substantial relationship

My problem with the appearance of impropriety standard isn't so much that it's
bad on its own terms, though I think it probably is. Rather, the standard
promotes the wrong idea--that in order to keep judges from acting unethically,
ethical rules must prevent judges from appearing to act unethically. It also
seems to suggest the converse: that if judges appear to be acting ethically, they
probably are. Nothing could be further from the truth. A judge can appear to
act ethically and still betray his responsibility in essential respects, and in ways
that no one will ever know about.
Id. at 1105.
58
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test” regarding former client conflicts as the litmus test for gauging the likelihood that
confidential information could be used to the disadvantage of the client.63 Specifically, Rule
1.9(a) prohibits representation of a client if the claim “is the same as, or substantially related
to” the previous representation or where such representation would be “materially adverse” to
the former client.64 Somewhat noteworthy, the significant relationship test applied even if no
confidences were divulged during the court of the representation65 – presumably to prevent an
attorney from consciously limiting the representation to leave the door open to future clients,
or fail to zealously pursue the former claim to leave a client legally vulnerable in the future.66
Thus, the principle evolved that an attorney may not attack his own work.67
As stated above, the provisions related to current client and former client conflict of
interests remained unchanged in the new version of the Model Rules.68 Other than
reorganizing the section regarding conflict of interests with a current client, the prohibitions
contained in Rules 1.7 and 1.9 remained substantively unchanged, with one caveat.69 Among
other minute changes, the Commission added a sentence in Comment 6 of Rule 1.7, “The
63
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Lawyer’s Interests,” which states that an attorney’s representation of a client may become
materially limited “when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an
opponent of the lawyer’s client, or with a law firm representing the opponent.”70
At first glance, the adoption of this language into the 2002 Model Rules suggests that
a lawyer or firm’s intent to either merge with an opposing law firm or represent an adverse
party would taint any subsequent withdrawal from the current client. However, ABA formal
opinion 96-400 sheds light on this new language. In the opinion, the ABA states:
A means that may be available, in some circumstances, to avoid the conflict
that would be presented by a lawyer’s employment negotiations with a firm he
opposes in a matter is for the lawyer to withdraw from the adverse
representation before having a substantive discussion with the firm. . . . [S]uch
withdrawal could be made without consent . . . if withdrawal can be
accomplished without adverse effect on the interests of the client.71
The opinion goes on to explain that the same analysis applies with equal force to a lawyer’s
discussions with an opposing law firm, as long as the attorney does not discuss the subject
matter of the current representation.72
To sum up, the core of the rules regarding attorney conflict of interests has remained
relatively unchanged since the original 1908 cannons. Though the rules themselves have been
re-organized from one rule paradigm to the next, the rules themselves continue to be
expressed in broad terms and strive to protect a lawyer’s professional independence and the
conservation of client secrets.
B. Attorney Withdrawal Rules
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The first rules governing attorney withdrawal did not appear until the adoption of the
Model Code in 1969. Canon 2 governed, inter alia, acceptance and withdrawal of client
representation.73 The rules for permissive withdrawal under the Code were relatively strict.
The comment to Canon 2 states “A decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on
the basis of compelling circumstances.”74 Consistent with the comment, the Code specifically
enumerated circumstances when it was within an attorney’s discretion to withdraw from a
client. The Code permitted withdrawal for cause where: a client has rejected an attorney’s
sound advice, seeks to file a meritless claim, or where continued representation was likely to
result in a violation of the Codes of Professional Conduct.75 Thus, the Code did not allow
withdrawal without client consent even if withdrawal would have no adverse affect on the
client’s interests.76
The largest difference between the 1969 Code and the 1983 Model Rules was the
ability to terminate permissibly from the representation “if withdrawal can be accomplished
without material effect on the interests of the client.”77 Paradoxically, a qualification
accompanied the Rule which states, “A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter
unless it can be performed competently, promptly . . . and to completion,”78 thus carrying over
vestiges of the Code’s trepidation towards pre-mature withdrawal. Nevertheless, as noted by
73
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Charles Wolfram, author of the seminal book, Modern Legal Ethics, “As a disciplinary rule,
the approach to the Model Rules is preferable. As statement about minimal loyalty towards a
client and the appropriate undertakings, the Code speaks on a higher plane.”79
In 2000, the American Legal Institute (ALI) established The Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers.80 The Restatement reversed the trend set by the ABA’s Model
Rules and advocates more stringent guidelines for permissive withdrawal, harkening back to
the traditionalist view under the old Canons. Under the Restatement, Chapter Two governs
the Client-Lawyer relationship, including attorney withdrawal81 and Chapter Eight governs
conflict of interests.

While the actual text of the relevant sections parallels the ABA’s rules,

it is comment c to Section 132, explaining the relationship between current and former client
conflicts and the permissive withdrawal rules, which epitomizes the Restatement’s strict
approach to the attorney withdrawal rules. Commentc states that “withdrawal is effective to
render a representation “former” for the purposes of this Section if it occurs at a point that the
client and the lawyer contemplated as the end of the representation” or if grounds for
“permissive withdrawal by the lawyer exist . . . and the lawyer is not motivated primarily by a
desire to represent a new client.”82 The comment then explicitly illustrates the hot potato rule
by explaining:
79
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80
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Law.
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If the lawyer is approached by a prospective client seeking representation in a
mater adverse to an existing client, the present-client conflict may not be
transformed into a former-client conflict by the lawyer’s withdrawal from the
representation of the existing client. A premature withdrawal violates the
lawyer’s obligation of loyalty to the existing client and can constitute a breach
of the client-lawyer contract of employment.83
Thus, the Restatement radically connotes that situations more mundane than a hot potato
scenario constitute a breach of loyalty; other instances of premature withdrawal, such as when
an attorney discharges a client due to an unexpected increase in workload or sickness, could
breach the client-lawyer contract of employment. As support for this proposition, the
Report’s note erroneously cites the traditional cases enunciating the hot potato rule in
disqualification proceedings,84 as will be explained in the next section, do not advocate such
an extreme contract-based theory.
Much of the Restatement’s approach was incorporated into the 2002 Model Rules.85
Yet, the liberal rules regarding permissive withdrawal contained in the 1983 version of the
Model Rules remains and the Restatement’s comments regarding the hot potato rule were not
adopted. As explained by Margaret Love, a member of the Ethics 2000 Commission, “the
text [of Rule 1.16] was restructured to make clear that a lawyer may withdraw for any reason
if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the
client.”86 Particularly, Love points out that one of the considerations in adopting the new
rules was “ethical restrictions on lawyer mobility” in light of “the legal profession’s rapidly
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changing internal and external environment.”87 As a whole, the Commission made only
“minor revisions” for the sake of clarification to the rules governing permissive withdrawal.88
In conclusion, the rules regarding conflict of interests pronounced by both the
Restatement (Third) and the ABA have remained relatively unchanged since the first set of
rules in 1908. Of those changes, the greatest development was the adoption of rules centered
on a risk calculus – weighing the potential of harm to the client with the realization that the
lawyer profession is rife with competing interests.89 Specifically, the concurrent conflict of
interest rules protected both the preservation of client confidentiality and the preservation of
loyalty – as viewed from the eyes of the client and the community at large. Meanwhile, the
rules regarding former client conflict of interests merely sought to forever preserve client
confidences and the prohibition of an attorney from attacking their own work from a prior
transaction. On the other hand, though the original Canons did not deal with the rules
regarding attorney withdrawal from representation of a client, the first rules regarding such in
the 1969 Code were relatively strict, but subsequent versions gave the attorney greater
discretion when there was no adverse effect on the client.

II. EVOLUTION OF THE HOT POTATO RULE
A. Formulation and Adoption of the Hot Potato Rule
The hot potato doctrine emerged from a series of cases dealing with factual situations
where an attorney failed to realize a potential conflict with a current client when accepting
87
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new employment and subsequently withdrew from the representation of the prior client to
avoid disqualification.90 Though not mentioned by name, the notion that one cannot “drop” a
disfavored client to avoid a conflict debuted in conflict of interest jurisprudence as early as
1980 in Unified Sewerage Agency v. JELCO, Inc.91 Yet, the so-called “hot potato rule” was
actually coined in the unimpressive Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Ass., Inc. seven years later, in
1987.92 For the next fifteen years, the principles underlying the hot potato doctrine spread
throughout the states and adopted by nearly every jurisdiction.93 However, like many other
rules, courts ran into instances where formulaic application of the hot potato rule produced
hollow, unjust results, and they began to carve exceptions the hot potato rule as early as
1990.94 Finally, in 2001 with the Santacroce v. Neff ,95 a decision out of the New Jersey
Federal District Court, the hot potato rule was expanded to include situations where a client
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pre-emptively dismisses a client in anticipation of a more lucrative potential client that the
attorney would otherwise be unable to represent concurrently.96
Though courts have been attempting to refine the underlying rationale of the hot
potato rule for nearly fifteen years, one coherent justification has not emerged. In any event,
two themes run through the garden-variety applications of the hot potato rule. First is the
deterrence of the “patently base and disloyal” act of a lawyer abandoning his client in order to
switch sides in the midst of litigation,97 and second is the concern for the public view of the
profession when an attorney does abandons a client out of self-interested greed.98 However,
this apparent justification does not hold water when held up against the spirit of the rules
regarding conflict of interest and permissive withdrawal.
The first case to promote the doctrine that the disqualification rules cannot be
circumvented by dropping the less-favored client was not based on loyalty at all. In Unified
Sewerage Agency v. JELCO,99 a law firm accepted representation of a contractor in a contract
dispute while contemporaneously engaged in representation against that contractor in an
unrelated embryonic dispute with the firm’s other client. Even though both parties initially
consented to the conflict, the contractor withdrew consent as litigation commenced,
discharged the law firm in the first lawsuit, and then moved to disqualify the law firm in the
96

Id. at 372.

97

Wolfram, supra note 93, at 708.

98

Harte Baltimore Ltd v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 655 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. Fl.

1987) is a good example of a court drawing upon the “appearance of impropriety standard”
for justification of attorney disqualification in a hot-potato scenario.
99

646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).

20

second lawsuit.100 The trial court applied Oregon’s former client rules that utilized a
primitive version of the “substantial relationship” test derived from judge-made law that states
“an attorney may not represent interests adverse to a former client if the factual context of the
later representation is similar or related to that of the former representation.”101 The Ninth
Circuit court disagreed and instead applied Canon 5, which governed concurrent
representational conflicts stating that “[Canon 5] continues even though the representation
ceases prior to the filing of the motion to disqualify. If this were not the case, the challenged
attorney could always convert a present client into a former client by choosing when to cease
to represent the disfavored client.”102
In the end, the law firm managed to escape disqualification, despite the court’s
application of the more stringent standard from Canon 5.103 Nonetheless, the facts of this case
do not appear to support the court’s central proposition. The application of Canon 5 in this
case didn’t thwart the law firm’s attempt to circumvent disqualification because the client was
the party who discharged the law firm, not vice versa. Instead, the court nearly fell into the
trap that many similarly situated courts do when faced with a disqualification issue: whether
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to allow a technical violation of the Ethical codes to be used as a weapon to deprive the
opposing party of its counsel of choice.104
For all intensive purposes, the law firm in Unified Sewerage Agency attempted to do
the act ethically throughout the concurrent litigation: it had obtained waivers from both parties
and on three different occasions met with the contractor to discuss whether it wanted the law
firm to continue to represent them in the litigation.105 Furthermore, the contractor did not
discharge the law firm until it had found a substitute, then opportunistically proceeded to wait
for the litigation to proceed for another seven months until filing the motion for
disqualification106 – reinforcing evidence that the law firm’s actions were either an attempt to
avoid disqualification, or at the very least, a result of disloyal behavior.
In Unified Sewerage Agency, the potential conflict always existed, but was allowable
under the Ethical Codes by virtue of the parties’ consent. In other words, the law firm, though
acting within the rules, was “tickling the dragon’s tail”107 throughout the course of the
proceedings by representing concurrently opposite parties. However, the most difficult
104
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DEXTER MASTERS, THE ACCIDENT (New York: Knopf 1955) (depicting the famous lab
accident on May 21, 1946, where Dr. Louis Slotin saved his staff when he separated two
pieces of uranium with his bare hands to halt a nuclear reaction, then tragically died of
radiation poisoning nine days later).
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problems often arise when the conflict arises after the agreement to represent a new client.
One of most common hot potato scenarios is created when two law firms merge. For
example, in Ransburg Corporation v. Champion Spark Plug Company,108 a law firm
represented a patent holder in an infringement proceeding against a spark plug company.
Sometime later, an attorney from a different law firm created a conflict of interest when
laterally relocated into the first law firm, bringing with him the spark plug company.109 The
patent holding company, upon learning of the concurrent representation of its adversary,
terminated the law firm and moved for disqualification in the initial proceedings.110 The
court, citing Unified Sewerage Agency, held that not only will the patent holding company be
treated as a current client for the purpose of not allowing easy circumvention of the rule,
bolstered by notions of a “client’s right to undivided loyalty” and the fear of public distrust in
“law firms that switch sides [so] nimbly.”111
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firm that was later disqualified solely on the “appearance of impropriety” grounds see Harte
Biltmore Ltd. v. First Pa. Bank, 655 F. Supp 419 (S.D. Fl. 1987) (noting that “[a]s mergers
between law firms become more common, attorneys are increasingly likely to find themselves
opposing a client after a merger” and that the “[p]ublic confidence in lawyers and the legal
system must necessarily be undermined when a lawyer suddenly abandons one client in favor
of another). Id. at 422.
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A recent case in Indiana is also illustrative of this problem. In Reed v. Hoosier Health
Systems, Inc.,112 a 2005 opinion from the Indiana Court of Appeals, a small law firm that
represented a number of shareholders in an action against Hoosier Health relocated into a law
firm that represented that same corporation through an insurance company.113 Though the
firm offered to withdraw from the representation of Hoosier Health, the court held that
disqualification was proper, citing that “the offense inherent in taking on the conflicting
representation is compounded by seeking to ‘fire’ the client in pursuit of the attorney’s
interest in taking on a new, more attractive client.”114
In the case of Hoosier Health, however, one judge concurred with the result, but
emphasized the potential danger in so readily granting disqualification.115 Most noteworthy,
Judge Barnes pointed out the ambiguity in Comment 4 to Rule 1.7, also present in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct,116 which provides, “If a conflict arises after representation has
been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation.”117 However,
Judge Barnes did not include the entire comment. Taken out of context, the Comment 4 to
Rule 1.7 in both the Indiana Rules and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct appear to
112
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leave open the justification for disqualifying a law firm from representing either party in a
lawsuit where a conflict arises after representation, as was the case in both Hoosier Health
and Ransburg Corporation. However, when the comment is read in its entirety, the ambiguity
is dispelled. The rest of the comment is as follows:
Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to
represent any of the clients is determined both by the lawyer’s ability to
comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer’s ability to
represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer’s duties
to the former client.118
Judge Barnes humbly points out the proper comment to undermine the majority’s reasoning,
but given the importance of the rest of the comment, he does not go far enough.
Finally, in Santacroce v. Neff, a court for the very first time held that a terminated
client would be treated as a current client in a disqualification hearing even though there
clearly was no overlap in representation.119 The proceeding involved a law firm that had long
represented multi-millionaire Arthur Goldberg in both personal matters and in many of his
corporations. After a while, the law firm began to represent Goldberg’s girlfriend,
Santacroce, in matters related to her jewelry business.120 Goldberg subsequently died and
failed to devise anything to his girlfriend. Shortly thereafter, the firm became aware that
Santacroce had the intent to bring a palimony action against the estate.121 In anticipation of
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representing Goldberg’s estate, the firm terminated representation of Santacroce and she filed
the palimony complaint a week later.122
The court applied Rule 1.7(a) governing current client conflicts, not Rule 1.9, in
contradiction to contrary precedent that stated that “[t]he relevant date for determining status
as a present or former client is the date on which the complaint was filed.”123 Instead, the
court ruled that the hot potato doctrine is the “exception to the general rule that the status of a
client must be determined by the date of the filed complaint”124 and that “the complaint’s
actual filing date is not particularly significant when notice of the proposed complaint is what
precipitated the [withdrawal.]”125 Again, the rationale for the court’s decision rested on the
dual purpose of the “duty of undivided loyalty to the client” and the possibility that the
“public confidence in attorneys and the legal system would be undermined.”126
Interestingly, the district court reiterated their holding in Universal City Studios Inc. v.
Reimerdes127 when it stated:
If, as one judge has written, “the act of suing one’s own client is a ‘dramatic
form of disloyalty,’” what might be said of trying to drop the first client in an
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effort to free the attorney to pursue his or her self-interest in taking on a newer
and more attractive professional engagement.128
However, in this case the temporal element of a lawyer dropping for a client for a “newer and
more attractive client” isn’t even present: there is no doubt that Goldberg was the law firm’s
client before Santacroce.129
As is evident from Unified Sewerage Agency, Ransburg Corporation, and Hoosier
Health, the circumstances under which the hot potato rule have been applied to disqualify law
firms for the breach of loyalty to their clients are not as simple as the hypothetical given in the
Introduction.130 On the contrary, the hot potato rule is most often applied when the law firm
or the attorney is not driven by greed, but rather faced with an ethical dilemma created by
forces mainly outside his or her control.

B. Exceptions to the Hot Potato Rule
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Even as jurisdictions were adopting the hot potato rule, other courts were already
revisiting the question of whether a conflict of interest exists whenever a law firm is forced to
choose between two current clients.131 As was alluded to in Unified Sewerage Agency, many
courts are now faced with the dilemma of the duty of the court “to enforce the ethical
obligations of the profession”132 and adherence to the hot potato exception when justice does
not require it.133 Common examples of when courts will allow a firm to drop one client in
favor of another when a conflict arises due to the unilateral actions of the client, or through
factors outside the control of the law firm. The exceptions have been appropriately labeled as
the “happenstance rule,” exemplified in Gould v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting134 and Florida
Insurance Guaranty Ass., Inc. v. Carey Canada, Inc.,135 or the “accommodation client rule,”
illustrated in In Re Rite Aid. 136
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In both Gouldand Florida Insurance Guarantee, the law firms encountered what the
New York City Bar Ethics Committee labels as “thrust upon” conflicts.137 In order for a
conflict to be considered “thrust upon” the lawyer or law firm, and therefore qualify as an
exception to the hot potato rule, four elements must exist:
1) [the conflict must] not exist at the time either representation commenced,
but arose only during the ongoing representation of both clients, where 2) the
conflict was not reasonably foreseeable at the outset of the representation, 3)
the conflict arose through no fault of the lawyer, and 4) the conflict is of a type
that is capable of being waived.138
In Gould, Jones, Day represented the company, Gould, against Pichi ney in a patentinfringement suit. At the same time, Jones, Day represented IGT in various matters. Shortly
thereafter, a conflict arose when created a conflict Picheney acquired IGT. The court held
that while concurrent representation of the two parties would certainly be considered
inappropriate, the court allowed Jones, Day to discontinue representation of either Gould or
IGT.139 The court supported the holding on the basis that it did not see how “the rules of
ethics will be furthered” by disqualifying Jones, Day due to a conflict that it did not create.”140
Similarly, in Florida Insurance Guaranty, a law firm represented a mining company
in asbestos litigation in the 1970s.141 At the same time, the law firm also represented a
Florida insurance company. In the 1980s, the mining company’s insurance carrier and all of
the other insurance carriers in the state became insolvent. By operation of law, the lone
137
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insurance company represented by the law firm was forced to assume the liability of all of the
insurance companies – including an insurance company currently involved in litigation
against the client mining company. Again, the court found that it would not “require
disqualification for the mere happenstance of an unseen concurrent adverse representation.”142
Balancing the interests involved, the court found that a judgment in the alternative would
“unfairly prevent a client from retaining counsel of choice and would penalize and attorney
who had done no wrong.”143
Courts have added a third exception to the hot potato rule individuals categorized as
“accommodation clients.” The irony, however, is that this same exception, more liberal than
the prior two exceptions, finds its genesis in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers.144 In Rite Aid, a law firm represented a corporation and it’s former CEO in
securities class litigation.145 As the litigation progressed, it became evident that the former
CEO breached its fiduciary duty to the corporation. Upon discovery, the law firm withdrew
their representation from the CEO, and he subsequently retained his own counsel. In this
instance, the court found that Rule 1.9 applied to the inquiry and not the more stringent Rule
1.7, and that the representation did not warrant disqualification because the CEO was merely
an accommodation client as and the corporation was the primary client.146 In other words, the
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representation of the CEO was by virtue of the concurrent representation of the corporation
and existed for the sake of lowering attorney costs.147
In essence, the court held that the “primary duty of loyalty” was to the corporation
and therefore the firm could withdraw without penalty.148 On its face, it would appear that
even under the more liberal “substantially relationship” test under Rule 1.9, continued
representation of the corporation would be barred. However, Comment i to the Restatement
(Third), which the court relied upon as authority,149 explains in situation arises between the
“primary client” and the “accommodation client,” the accommodation client “impliedly
consent[s] to the lawyer’s continuing to represent the regular client in the matter.”150

III. ANALYSIS OF THE INCONGRUENCE OF THE HOT POTATO RULE AND THE MODEL RULES
The adoption of the hot potato rule represents a dramatic shift in the and way that
conflict of interests and attorney withdrawal has been viewed in attorney ethics and the
interests the modern ethical rules seek protect. The purpose of the conflict of interest rules are
three fold 1) protect client confidentiality, 2) maintain an attorney’s independent judgment,
and 3) maintain the client’s and the public’s confidence in attorneys and the legal system.151
Meanwhile, the attorney withdrawal rules seek to balance lawyer mobility, professional
147
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independence and an attorney’s own moral constitution with the countervailing interests of
preventing or minimizing harm to the client.152 The purpose of this section is to prove that the
hot potato rule does not adequately invoke any of these interests in any of these three
applications.
The hot potato rule cannot be supported on the text of the conflict of interests rules or
the rules governing an attorney’s ability to withdraw from representation permissively. In this
section, each of the scenarios where the hot potato rules have been applied will be analyzed in
turn. The first scenario is when an attorney unwittingly becomes entangled in a conflict of
interest between two current clients. Though this scenario is the most difficult to defend
because the attorney is faced with co-equal duties of loyalty to each of his clients.153 Any
attempt to protect the interests of one of the clients necessarily causes injury to the other.154
Thus, as one judge has noted, the effect of allowing the attorney to choose which client to
drop is equivalent to “dividing clients into two classes and holding that lawyers may injure a
second-class client with impunity so long as they do so to advance the interest of a first-class
client.”155
However, this fear is unavailing and fails to take into account the alternative – that is,
forcing an attorney to withdraw totally from both representations. Keep in mind; just because
an attorney attempts to turn one client into a “former client” vis-à-vis withdrawal, he is not
immune from the repercussions of his unethical actions of concurrently representing adverse
152
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clients. Rule 1.7 comment 3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that when “[a]
conflict of interest [exists] before representation is undertaken . . . the representation must be
declined, unless the lawyers obtains the informed consent of each client.”156 Therefore, the
breach in loyalty is the result of accepting the adverse representation in the first place. In any
event, the attorney is liable for sanctions, providing a “solemn denunciation of a violation of a
lawyer’s ethical duties.”157 Enforcement of the hot potato rule in this context only carries it
into disqualification proceedings; however, at this point, the damage has already been done.
The only added effect is both parties are deprived of their attorney of choice as opposed to
just one.158
The second situation arises when a client originally consents to a conflict and
subsequently withdraws that consent, as in the case of Unified Sewerage Agency.159
However, the Model Rules explicitly deal with this situation in the comments and describe a
different outcome than the hot potato rule.160 Comment 21 states:
A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like
any other client, may terminate the lawyer’s representation at any time.
Whether revoking consent to the client’s own representation precludes the
lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the
circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked
because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of

156

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7 cmt. 3 (2002).

157

Saloman, 790 F. Supp at 1401.

158

Id.

159

See, e.g. Unified Sewerage Agency, 646 F.2d at 1344.

160

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7 cmt. 21 (2002).

33

the other client and whether material detriment to the other clients of the
lawyer would result.161
This comment is in direct opposition to the prohibition in the hot potato rule for two reasons.
First, it is implicit in the comment that the attorney withdraws from the representation when a
client revokes his consent. If this were not the case, the second clause stating “[w]hether
revoking consent to the client’s own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to
represent other clients” would be rendered inoperative because Comment 6 of the same rule
states that “a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyers
represents in some other matter, even when the maters are wholly unrelated.”162 This clause
is a reference, in part, to the “substantial relationship” test under rule 1.9 governing former
client conflicts. Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the comment is that when the matters are
wholly unrelated and a client has consented to the concurrent representation, representation of
the other client will be appropriate.
Second, because withdrawal did not cause actual harm to the now-former client, that
client’s interests are weighed, pursuant to the last clause of the comment, against the interests
of both the lawyer and the other client.163 Here, the other client is innocent and should not
have to bear the cost of the other client revoking their consent.164 The attorney is innocent as
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well because he fulfilled his initial duty of giving both clients informed consent.165 Forcing
the attorney to withdraw from both cases entirely is a “material” detriment under Comment
21. On balance, a client’s exercise of the right to revoke consent and the loyalty of their
attorney does not justify depriving a second client of their choice of comments in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct address this situation.
As the concurring judge noted in Reed, Rule 1.7 comment 4 explains that when a
conflict arises after representation commences, Rule 1.16 governs whether the attorney may
continue to represent any of the clients after the attorney withdraws from the representation
that caused the conflict.166 Such a reading has two effects. First, forcing an attorney to
withdraw from the other representation according to the hot potato rule would render this
comment worthless. Second, the law would have the contradictory effect of prohibiting the
continuation of conflicting representation while prohibiting withdrawal to avoid it.167
The final two scenarios raise serious questions relating to our current system of
attorney ethics, loyalty, and the state of the legal marketplace. The true hot potato scenario,
where there is a “gap” between the withdrawal from one client and the formation of the
attorney-client relationship of the new, more lucrative client,168 calls into question the purpose
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of loyalty in ethics jurisprudence and the risks that the rules of attorney professional conduct
wish to take into consideration.
As described prior, the current approach of the ethical rules is to balance the inevitably
of an attorney facing a conflict with the relative risk that an intolerable amount of harm will
manifest.169 Therefore, an analysis of what harms are likely to befall the “dropped” client and
which principles seek to protect his interests under the hot potato rule is required. There is no
doubt that loyalty is the central concern in the conflict of interests rules and the hot potato
rule. However, pushed to its outer boundaries, notions of loyalty deprive individuals from
obtaining their clients of choice170 – ultimately leading to a shortage in supply of legal
services and higher attorney’s fees. Therefore, only issues of loyalty that have the potential to
cause actual harm are taken into consideration. In case of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, a breach of loyalty is intolerable when 1) there is a risk that confidential client
information is shared, 2) representation will be limited due to the interests another, and 3)
sufficient damage to the public’s confidence will occur.171
Geoffrey Hazards and William Hodes, authors of The Law of Lawyering, are the most
ardent, and arguably only, opponents of the hot potato rule.172 Their first argument rests on
the relationship between Rules 1.7 and Rules 1.9 – the rules governing current and former
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client conflicts, respectively.173 Both rules deal explicitly with the protection of loyalty, but to
varying degrees based on the interests involved.174 For the most part, the analysis for whether
an attorney has breached his duty of loyalty to either a former client or a present client is
largely the same; the goal of the former client rules is to “provide assurance during the
representation that they have no need to fear suffering adverse consequences later of having
retained a lawyer currently.”175 The one exception is that an attorney cannot concurrently
represent two clients, absent consent, even if those matters are unrelated.176 In this respect,
the loyalty interest regarding the representation of current client is less “concrete.”177 On the
other hand, the requirement that an attorney cannot represent anyone in a matter adverse to a
current client reflects the intangible harm to the ongoing client relationship when an attorney
presently advocates against that client.
Second, concurrently representing two clients in unrelated matters assumes there
remains a subconscious risk that the attorney’s professional judgment will be compromised.178
Conversely, under the “substantial relationship” analysis, Rule 1.9 protects attorney loyalty to
former clients because it prevents the attorney from using confidential information in future,
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related matters.179 Therefore, the hot potato rule’s requirement of using the current conflict of
interests rules in analyzing whether there has been a breach of loyalty is erroneous because
the hot potato rule does not call into question the independence of the attorney’s professional
judgment or harm to the ongoing attorney-client.
The largest roadblock to Hazard & Hodes structural argument is the adoption of
Comment 6 to Rule 1.7 dealing with job negotiations with an adverse firm or party.180 Recall,
Comment 6 warns against the possibility of an attorney’s own economic interest materially
limiting the efficacy of a current representation.181 Yet, the accompanying ABA Formal Op.
96-400 actually encourages withdrawal from the representation absent client consent.182
Thus, instead of Comment 6 being the strongest support for the hot potato rule in the Model
Rules, the ABA’s interpretation is explicit disapproval of it.
Hazard & Hodes second argument against the hot potato rule is that it is contrary to
the permissive withdrawal scheme under Rule 1.16 of the Model Rules if Professional
Conduct because “those provisions permit a lawyer to cease representation – assuming no
harm to the client – for no reason or because the lawyer is bored or overworked or because
more lucrative work presents itself.”183 To Hazard and Hodes, there is no breach of loyalty to
the former client because he has not suffered a cognizable harm under Rule 1.16(b).184
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Viewed through this framework, the hot potato rule exemplifies a tension in the rules
themselves: the fact that loyalty to a client “subjugates personal autonomy” of the attorney.185
The Model Rules recognizes this tension and therefore aims to limit an attorney’s discretion
to withdraw when the client will suffer harm. The hot potato rule’s addition of a mental
element to the permissive withdrawal rule while dispensing of the showing of harm
requirement is an aberration in the entire withdrawal scheme.186 The result, Hazard & Hodes
concludes, is to impermissibly “convert the lawyer-client relationship into one of continuing
servitude.”187

On a deeper level, this damages the personal nature of the attorney client

freedom because it limits the ability of the attorney to choose which causes are worthy of their
loyalty;188 the hot potato rule imposes that choice upon him.
In many ways, Hazard & Hodes criticisms of the hot potato rule in this context fail to
take into account the most oft cited reason for the rule: the public’s negative view of an
attorney who fickly drops a client for monetary purposes.189 Upon inspection, this reason
cannot be justified given the current approach of the Model Rules for two reasons.
First, the harm, if any caused by such an act is not morally equivalent to the other
areas of the Model Rules that take into account an attorney’s motivation. There are two other
sections of the Model Rules where misconduct is dependent on the lawyer’s motivation. The
first is contained in Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule. 4.4 – Respect for Third Parties.
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Under Rule 4.4, it is misconduct for “a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.”190 The second area is under
Rule 8.4 comment 3, which states, “A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client,
knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.”191 Actions
contrary to rule 8.4 are unethical under the general principle that any attempt to use the courts
to cause harm undermines elementary notions of justice. Even absent harm, an attorney’s
motivation to perpetuate a wrong via the courts calls into question his role as an officer of the
court. As for the comment to Rule 8.4, there is no comparison to an attorney who is driven
partially by greed, a principle that is acceptable under the Model Rules, and one who uses
their position as an attorney to witness their prejudices. Moreover, under Rule 8.4 there is
only a violation if “such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice,”192 contrary to
the hot potato rule where no harm is required.
The hot potato rule, Rule 8.4, and Rule 4.4 have “intrinsic,” as opposed to
“instrumental” justifications for their existence.193 In the student project titled Developments
in the Law – Conflicts of Interests in the Legal Profession, II. Models of Ethical Regulation,
the authors extensively explore the philosophical underpinnings of the ethical precepts that
govern attorney conduct.194 In the article, an intrinsically justified form is misconduct is one
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that is “prohibited, not because of [its] consequences, but because of structured features of the
act itself that make it wrong to bring about the consequence in this way.”195 In this respect,
the hot potato rule based on intrinsic justifications, not because of the harm that occurs, but
because dropping a client disrespects the “integrity of the client as an individual” and is
“inherently wrong.”196 If this is true, the permissive withdrawal rule embodied in Rule
1.16(b)(1) could not exist at all because this intrinsic view implies that an attorney is unethical
whenever an attorney chooses to end his fiduciary relationship before its natural conclusion
because the attorney has, by definition, placed some other interest above the desire to further
represent the client.
Ethics that are justified intrinsically naturally have their genesis under Canon 5’s
“appearance of impropriety” standard – the vestige that an attorney is acting ethical as long as
he appears to be acting ethical.197 In any event, Rule 1.9 governing conflicts of interests still
provides the better paradigm. When the attorney-client relationship is severed, an attorney’s
actions only appear disloyal if they are relevant to the prior representation.198 At the same
time, regardless of the framework to evaluate the conduct, speculative harms that seek to
protect the public, or, at the very least, hypothetical client expectations are only justified if the
harms are great.199 In terms of the hot potato rule, the harms to the public or to the
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expectations of the individual client are neither probable nor substantial enough to justify its
limiting effect on individual attorney decision-making.

IV. PRACTICAL EFFECT S OF THE HOT POTATO RULE
In addition to the lack of support for hot potato rule under the current Model Rules and
the philosophical underpinnings of the attorney-client relationship, three problems emerge
when the hot potato rule is applied to garden variety premature withdrawal scenarios. First,
the hot potato rule is not likely to apply to small law firms or concern the most vulnerable
clients.200 Second, the efficacy of the rule is limited under the fact that the prohibition is
“contracted around” via advance waiver agreements offered by large law firms. Third, in the
absence of an advance waiver agreement, the rule is circumvented the ability of law firms to
juggle potentially adverse clients until the proverbial plate can be cleared of all conflicts.201
Whenever an attorney withdraws before the natural completion of the representation,
transactional costs necessarily are borne by the client.202 Early withdrawal forces the client to
find new counsel and expend resources getting the new counsel “up to speed” in the litigation.
This is true regardless of whether the client suffers actual prejudice from the withdrawal.
Individuals suffer the most from attorney withdrawal because of the “informational
assymetr[y]” that exists between unsophisticated clients and their attorneys and the fact that
individuals are less adept at navigating through the legal marketplace.203 Thus, it follows
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logically that individuals, particular those less affluent, as “one shot participants in the [legal]
marketplace,”204 will suffer the greatest economic harm from the severance of the agency
relationship between attorney and client in hot potato scenarios.205 Paradoxically, individuals
are the least likely victims of being dropped like a hot potato because they pose little threat of
barring a law firm from future representation from a conflict of interest. In contrast, a
corporation may have multiple subsidiaries and be engaged in numerous lawsuits in any given
moment, thus creating multiple avenues upon which the client may veto future
representation.206
Second, smaller law firms tend to represent less affluent, individual clients tend.207
Small law firms are less likely to be tempted to drop a client because they, as a whole,
encounter less unforeseeable conflicts of interest less often than larger law firms do.208 As
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concurrently representing either co-defendants or co-plaintiffs in a lawsuit or criminal matter
tend to be common in smaller law firms. However, as a practical matter, these situations do
not need to invoke the hot potato rule because upon withdrawal a conflict would still exist
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Susan Shapiro, sociologist and senior research fellow for the American Bar Association,
presents in Tangled Loyalties: Conflict of Interest in Legal Practice, “[c]onflicts of interest
multiply rapidly as firms expand.”209 In her book, Shapiro illustrates this when she quotes a
downstate Illinois lawyer who claims that concurrently representing two clients whose
interests are adverse is “as freak as running into the same guy twice on the highway.”210
Because larger law firms are more likely to have a greater number of clients, and, of
those clients, a greater percentage of them will be complex organizations (i.e. corporations), it
is therefore certain that the hot potato rule will overwhelmingly be invoked against larger law
firms representing corporations or their subsidiaries.211 However, while the makeup of a law
firm’s clientele may make it susceptible to conflicting interests, it is often the bureaucratic
nature of the law firm that enables it to “skirt” the hot potato rule.212

“Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the
common representation fails.”)
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The first and most obvious way for a law firm to become nearly immune is for the
client to sign a prospective waiver to consenting to the conflict.213 Prospective waivers to
consent to future conflicts are permissible according to the ABA.214 A client may consent to a
conflict arising under the hot potato rule despite the adverse party is not identifiable; the client
only needs to be “given enough information to make an intelligent decision.”215 However, the
ability of a client to consent to this type of conflict of interest is problematic because the
conflict is inherently a moral one.216 The supposed conflict in the hot potato rule cannot be
cured by screening, so it is difficult to justify how a client can consent to a “patently base and
disloyal” action.217 As a practical matter, Shapiro notes, clients tend to disfavor these
“lawyer-client prenuptial agreements . . . for the same reason lovers decry prenuptial
agreements: they represent a rather distrustful, pessimistic beginning to a relationship, at best,
and may scare off prospective partners at worst.”218 It is common for corporations to have
rules to never consent to a conflict.219
Even absent a waiver from a client, large law firms have devised way to circumvent
the hot potato rule. In Tangled Loyalties, Shapiro gives several examples of how law firms
are able to use their large bureaucracies to juggle smaller clients while anticipating larger
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ones.220 The most common method is the “screw up excuse,” which may be possible when a
firm receives a smaller case on referral and a more lucrative client presents itself a short time
later.221 Here, the firm will merely call back the referring attorney or law firm and as one
attorney put it, “claim a mistake had been made, that our docket department screwed up and
we already had the case in for somebody else.”222 Another tactic is keeping the new client in
limbo, or “juggling the hot potato.”223 In this case, the attorney tells the new client that they
must check in with their “executive committee,” or the equivalent, until the firm is able to
“clear the underbrush” and remove whatever conflicts may be present.224 In essence, “firms
[are able to] use their bureaucratic intake procedures as a delaying tactic, [or] use their
contacts with insurers are a buffer between clients, and so on.”225
To be sure, corporations deserve loyal representation just as much as individuals,
however, the justifications supporting the hot potato rule break down when applied in the
corporate context. First, supporters of the hot potato rule expose a “friendship” view of the
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attorney-client relationship; that is, loyalty is breached when the attorney takes any action not
authorized by his client.226 However, this view weakens as corporations begin to treat outside
legal services as a commodity.227 Today, more corporations utilize in-house counsel for
routine legal work and utilize firms on a “project by project, case by case basis.”228 They also
tend to allocate their legal needs to several law firms at the same time.229 Therefore, the risk
that the corporation has actually felt “betrayed” is relatively slight when the corporation
already has other counsel waiting in the wings.230 The same is true when the corporation has
the luxury of in-house counsel, as was the case in Ransburg Corp.231 As the court in Atromick
International, Inc v. Drustar232 noted, “The concepts of having a ‘personal attorney’ or a
‘general corporate counsel’ are much less meaningful today, especially among sophisticated
users of legal services, than in the past.”233 The progression is natural: “[a]s corporate clients
226
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. . . become less loyal to the firms they hire, lawyers . . . become less loyal to the firms that
employ them.”234
Because there is no actual “harm” done to the client from the actual withdrawal, i.e.
the case was not prejudiced, it is unlikely that true hot potato scenarios are brought to the
attention of disciplinary officials. In addition, the ex post review system inherent in
disciplinary processes are of little use to corporations.235 Instead, corporations depend on
disqualification motions to enforce the ethical rules.236 Thus, because there has been no
actual harm to the client and because it is unrealistic to say that the corporation is “betrayed”
by the so-called disloyal act of the attorney, the use of disqualification as a mode of
enforcement of the ethical rules is inappropriate – the proceedings have not been “tainted” by
the acts of the attorney.237
When used as a vehicle for exacting attorney disqualification, the hot potato rule is
reduced to a mere “pretext to cause their adversaries expense and delay.”238 This, in turn,
encourages “taint-shoppers,” which are defined as “institutional clients [that] sprinkle
insignificant litigation among many firms, solely so they may bring motions to disqualify
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their opponent’s counsel in future litigation.”239 Many courts, including the one in Reed v.
Hoosier Health, have already acknowledged this danger.240 In the end, the use of the hot
potato rule as a “sword”241 to disqualify opposing counsel may have the effect of
“undermining public confidence in the legal profession.”242
Finally, all conflict of interest rules inevitably “pit partners or practice groups against
each other” because “decisions about which client to take and which client to turn away”
inevitably leads to prioritization of one group above another.243 As Shapiro notes at the end
of her discussion, the extension of the client’s veto to future representation vis-à-vis the hot
potato rule leaves the law firm with no choice but to decline representation from the
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perspective client, thus exposing further the “fault lines within the law firm” when “a lawyer
bringing in a huge piece of business is paralyzed by the paltry case of a colleagues.”244

IV. CONCLUSION
The rationales supporting the application of the hot potato rule are unavailing in
today’s legal marketplace.245 On the one hand, the intentions of those who support rule are
admirably idealistic; but the rule as applied fails to produce its desired effect.246 As a matter
of logic, the hot potato rule does not to sit squarely within the current Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, specifically within the liberal rules governing permissive
withdrawal.247 As a matter or principle, conceptions of loyalty in the hot potato doctrine do
not comport with the type of interests traditionally protected under the conflict of interests
rules.248 Finally, as applied, the rule fails to protect the type of clients that are least able to
bear the costs of an attorney’s premature withdrawal.249 As infrequent and unsophisticated
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users of legal services, individuals are more likely to view their attorney as a counselor, and
less of an advocate.250 Individuals innately feel the sense of betrayal when an attorney
suddenly abandons them in order to “switch sides” or pursue representation of another
client.251 Nonetheless, overzealous use of the hot potato rule by corporate clients not even
harmed increases the danger of producing unnecessary and damaging satellite litigation, the
sole purpose of which is to increase overall costs of litigation and cause delay.252 In this
respect, the hot potato rule has been adopted in an era where it has no import.
The hot potato rule is a rule by fiat. As such, courts have attempted to justify its
existence based on broad aphorisms of loyalty with little inquiry into their underlying worth.
The effect is that courts, from the very beginning, have had to revisit the rule in order to carve
out numerous exceptions to find a “fit” for the rule in today’s professional thought and
practice.253 As more exceptions are created, the shaky framework upon which the hot potato
rule was built withers under its own weight. Therefore, the American Bar Association and the
courts in the respective states need to resuscitate the permissive rules of withdrawal that focus
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on the actual harm caused to the client and not the attorney’s subjective motivation for doing
so.
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